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Abstract: This paper seeks to identify the role of play in the design and
function of Socratic dialogue as practiced in community of philosophical
inquiry (CPI) in classrooms. It reviews the ideas of some major play theorists
from various fields of study and practice—philosophy, cultural anthropology, evolutionary psychology, cognitive psychology, psychoanalysis, and
education—and identifies the epistemological, ontological, and axiological
judgments they share in their analyses of the phenomenon of play. It identifies five psychodynamic dimensions in which the Socratic play of “following
the argument where it leads” can be identified: the “play space,” the “time
of play,” “the rules of the game,” “the stakes in play,” and “play and power.”
Finally, it suggest that there is a historical relationship between the reconstruction of Socratic dialogue in CPI and the cultural reconstruction of “child”
in post-modern philosophy, with special attention to Gilles Deleuze’s and
Felix Guattari’s notion of “becoming-child” as emblematic of an emergent
“post-human” style of subjectivity.

In questioning the structure and dynamics of communal, collaborative philosophical inquiry in the classroom and their implications for
philosophy pedagogy, it might be good to begin by thinking more
comprehensively about the phenomenon of play, and its ontological
and epistemological status. Erik Erikson (1963) called play the “royal
road to understanding” on the way to “the ego’s efforts at synthesis”
(209), an “intermediate reality between fantasy and actuality” (212).
Lev Vygotsky (1978) characterized play as a “field of meaning” in
which a “new relation between thought and reality” is made possible,
and James Hans (1981) speaks of an “altered epistemological framework” (22–23) that explores the relation between outward and inward,
reason and sense, freedom and necessity. Can we say this about the
nature of community of philosophical inquiry (CPI),1 whether among
children or adults? Is CPI—as a logical, cognitive, discursive, affec© Teaching Philosophy, 2018. All rights reserved. 0145-5788
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tive and linguistic structure and process—inherently playful? When
we experience what we consider to be an exemplary session of CPI,
do we feel that we are “at play”? And if so, can the field of meaning
that is play be entered at will, and manufactured as curriculum and
pedagogical method? Are there different types or levels of play, and
can we make qualitative judgments about their value for philosophical
inquiry? What is play?
The significance of CPI as a pedagogical innovation is difficult to
overestimate. Broadly speaking, it could be said to represent the transition (or transformation) of philosophical practice from a monological
to a dialogical one. Its form and function is typically associated with
Socrates’s practice, and apart from the aporias, ambiguities and ironies that permeate the relationship between his ideas and those of his
amanuensis (or fictionalizer) Plato, it signals a fundamental shift from
philosophy understood as an aristocratic, prophetic, spiritual, inspired,
cataphatic activity to a communal, democratic, deliberative, secular and
apophatic one, and as such an enduring connection between philosophical practice and the practice of democracy. More than two millennia
later, the “Socratic method” is practiced in a variety of styles, whether
in the classical form of law school pedagogy, in Leonard Nelson’s more
scripted protocols (Chesters 2012), in Ekkehard Martens’s Five-Finger
Model (Marsal 2014), or in the manner articulated by Matthew Lipman
and Ann Sharp, founders of Philosophy for Children, who, it could be
argued, have captured its dialogical, emergent, autotelic properties—and
as such its playful qualities—most compellingly. CPI on this model
introduces a shift in our understanding of 1) the philosophy teacher’s
role—that is, as interlocutor, coach, model and fellow participant as
opposed to encyclopedist and keeper of a given tradition; 2) philosophy
as a discursive activity based on participants’ questions rather than a
collection of knowledge claims, and hence the deconstruction of the
tradition into the questions and concepts that led to it; which results
in 3) the autopoietic emergence of an “argument” that, if we “follow it
where it leads,” (the dictum of the Socratic group encounter), promises,
however distantly, the reconstruction of that tradition; and finally 4) a
form of ethical practice, implicitly emancipatory, in which the question
“What shall we then do?” tends to precede rather than follows questions
of metaphysics, and which thereby exemplifies deep democratic practice. In the genealogy of play as an ontological category that follows,
and in its application to the practice of CPI in the classroom, I wish to
offer an understanding of the philosophy classroom as an ideal setting
for the autopoietic play of ideas, and the power of this understanding
as a concrete framework for philosophy pedagogy. In order to ground
this understanding, I will attempt a synthesis of the ideas of some major
play theorists, and apply their analyses to the phenomenon of CPI as it
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unfolds in the classroom. They come from various fields of study and
practice—philosophy, cultural anthropology, evolutionary psychology,
cognitive psychology, psychoanalysis, and education—but their ideas
are deeply interwoven on the philosophical level—that is, on the level
of epistemological, ontological, and axiological judgment.2

The Play Space
One image that occurs repeatedly in the literature on play theory is a
spatial one. Both Vygotsky and Hans-Georg Gadamer (1975) use the
term “field”—“field of play” or “field of meaning.“ Friedrich von Schiller (1965), who may be characterized as the initiator of play theory,
speaks of a spielraum or “play space,” and Gadamer, in amplifying this
idea, goes so far as to characterize this space as a “sacred precinct,” a
sort of temenos, a “closed world . . . marked out for the movement of
the game . . . without transition and mediation over against the world
of aims” (1975: 96). D. W. Winnicott (1978), the infant psychoanalyst
also deeply influenced by Schiller, speaks of “transitional” psychological space, an “intermediate zone” or “third area,” and elsewhere as a
“potential space.” It is a space, like the space of theatre, of profound
experience of any kind—including art and philosophy—in which the
hard line between fantasy and reality, the subjective and the objective
realms, is blurred or ruptured, and things appear in a new light. Schiller
identified a transitional divide between the “sensuous” impulse—immediate experience, sensation, materiality, necessity, finitude, contingency,
dasein—and the rational or “formal” impulse, which “strives to set [us]
at liberty, to bring harmony into the diversity of [our] manifestation, and
to maintain [our] person through every change of circumstance” (66).
Their confluence—in art, philosophy and deep emotional experience—
is the space of the aesthetic, where the “play impulse” (spieltrieb)
“would aim at the extinction of time in time and the reconciliation of
becoming with absolute being, of variations with identity” (74). It is,
as Winnicott describes it based on his experience with infants, a “third
area of human living, one neither inside the individual nor outside in
the world of reality.” This is echoed by the self psychology therapist
Russell Meares (1993), who discovers in his patients’ experience “a
space in which there is neither inner nor outer, and in which internal
reality and external reality coexist” (39).
In the circle of CPI, the stage is set for the emergence of such a
spielraum, a potential space that is also fundamentally intersubjective and interlocutive—a space of self and others. It is, of course, a
performance space, but an involuntary one: a living space in which
the script, in the give and take of the dialogue of ideas, writes itself—
ideas are, so to speak, elicited from us by the triggers and prompts of
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other ideas—and in which the signifiers (ideas, judgments, analogies,
definitions, etc.), which represent each of us as we speak them, also
have a rhizomatic life of their own. They represent the formal impulse:
we are led by the argument, we do not lead it, we are directed by the
play and not vice versa; as Gadamer says, “The players are not the
subjects of play; instead play . . . reaches presentation through the
players” (Gadamer 1975: 92), who are triggered by whatever stimulus
the teacher or the students have chosen to inaugurate the play of ideas.

The Time of Play
The time of play is also transitional, here in the sense that it is an interruption of chronos or linear, chrono-logical time, and an experience of
what Gadamer refers to as “the temporality of the aesthetic,” which is
“timelessness” and which, he adds “is only a dialectical feature which
arises out of temporality and in contrast with it” (Gadamer 1975: 108).
Play-time is ek-static time—a being-present that has the character of
being outside of oneself, of seeing the whole—not from the outside,
as from an Archimedean Point, but from the inside, through losing
oneself in the play—in the case of CPI, the play of concepts. Our
being-played results, Gadamer suggests, in seeing the world “in the
heightened truth of its being” (121), which invokes the temporality of
kairos, the experience of time associated with appearance, manifestation, fulfillment, completion.
The shared space-time of the CPI group is an exercise in simultaneity, and we may characterize the group as a virtual collective
subject. As such it has a certain telepathic quality, which Maurice
Merleau-Ponty referred to as mutual “contagion,” or Paul Schilder “the
movement of body images into each other” (quoted in Kennedy 1994).
This ghostly intimacy of the collective subject is a kairotic epiphany
of group consciousness—a virtual consciousness whose language is
expressed in the moves and permutations of the argument, as well as
in the interplay of gaze, gesture and vocalization (prosody). The group
is one polymorphic body whose various parts are dancing with each
other, however clumsily or indecisively. Here, in kairos, we approach
Gadamer’s characterization of play as “transformation into structure,”
in which “all playing is a being played . . . [T]he game tends to master
the players” (95), and “the player experiences the game as a reality
that surpasses him” (98).
Put differently, we experience time as what Alfred Schutz (1973)
called a “tension of consciousness” that is unhindered by the drive to
produce, to acquire, to dominate or submit. So both Jerome Bruner
(1981) and Erikson, in their topographies of play, identify play with
drive reduction—that is, play is not excessively attached to results,
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maintaining a loose linkage between means and ends. The means
become the ends, and we experience the release from drive that is
necessary for problem-solving, creativity, for “thinking again.” We are
speaking here of a form of being in the world, an experience of time
that mediates between what Schutz calls “wide awake” consciousness—
a world of objectification, use, goal orientation, and strictly linear
organization of time—and oneiric (dream) time, which is the time of
one’s own imagination, a kind of time in which the divided, exclusionary organization of kronos between past present and future breaks
down and we are caught up in the to-and-fro self renewing movement
of the event. As a tension of consciousness, the temporality of play is
identified by Heraclitus (2003) as yet a third category—aion,3 typically
translated as “eternity” but having nothing to do with an afterlife—and
associated with the being of childhood. Aion is the temporality of
life itself, of Bergson’s la durée in its flows, cuts and intensities, and
with the time of festival, of revel, of release from the instrumental.
Philosophy, like art, unfolds in this zone of indeterminacy—the zone
of the “what is?,” “what if?,” “what can?,” “what might?,” and “what
should?” Its association with childhood is significant for philosophy
with children, a movement whose historical distinction is to have reappropriated the Socratic dialogical circle and transformed it in the
context of children themselves.
What is particularly compelling about the phenomenon of fully
functional CPI is that this experience of aionic time is a shared one—a
mediation of each individual participant’s lived time with the lived time
of the others in the virtual space of the dialogic circle. In this form of
cooperative play, two forms of existential temporal alienation are—if
provisionally and often only fitfully—overcome: 1) The chrono-logical
experience of interpersonal disruptive asynchronicity that Emmanuel
Levinas (1987) identified as our ontological condition—“the time of the
other and my time do not occur at the same time; the time of the other
disrupts my temporality” (12)—and 2) in Jean-Paul Sartre’s terms, the
existential experience of chronos as “being-for-itself”—a divided mode
of being that can never be wholly identical with itself—can never attain
to “being-in-itself,” the way rocks and trees and even other animals
are; to do so would be to become other than oneself. Temporally, this
means that I am never finished. Of the three temporal moments of the
for-itself, Sartre (1966) says, “at present it is not what it is, [because
I am also my past,] and it is what it is not [because I carry my future
with me as a horizon]” (168).
The subjective alienation that is at the heart of the being of chronos is overcome in aion, which, as Heraclitus tells us, is manifest as
“child playing” (or literally “child childing”), in what Gadamer, in
his analysis of play, characterizes as the time of celebration, festival,
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of “self forgetfulness and reconciliation with self,” of “ek-stasis” and
“absolute presence” (Gadamer 1975: 111), in which we are played
by something beyond us—in this case, the Argument, which we are
committed to following where it leads. It is also a moment in which
the Sartrean “being-for-others”—that condition of intersubjectivity in
which, on his (1966) account, “the Other is . . . the radical negation
of my experience, since he is the one for whom I am not subject but
object” (310)—is overcome. In the space and time of philosophical
play, “the thematic horizon [in this case, the Argument] is not limited
by any being-for-itself of subjectivity . . . [T]here are no subjects who
are behaving ‘playfully.’ . . . The players are not the subjects of play:
instead,” to repeat, “play reaches presentation through the players”
(Gadamer 1975: 92). By losing ourselves in the moment of being-initself, the “pure self presentation” (94) that is play, the ontological
conundrum represented by my being-for-others is lifted. So play lifts the
onus of mutual objectification of my being-for-others and the temporal
“anguish” of being-for-itself and affords me the experience—through
the spontaneous interplay of the “moves” of argumentation—of the initself, the world of aion. As such, philosophical play is, as Eugen Fink
(1960) puts it, “a symbolic act of representation, in which human life
interprets itself” (106), a “spectacle which might represent the whole
as in a parable, producing a clarifying and speculative metaphor of
the world” (109).
This is obviously an idealized picture, and the success of any particular instance of CPI depends, not just on our shared ability to enter
(or rather, to be entered into) aionic time together and to stay there,
but on our sensitivity to the implicit rules or principles that organize
the self-structuring, autotelic movement of the conceptual play of the
dialogue, and our sensitivity to the Argument that is continually emerging through that play, in what Gadamer calls its “to-and fro movement
. . . which has no goal that would bring it to an end . . . [and] which
renews itself in constant repetition” (Gadamer 1975: 93). This sense of
space, time and their implicit rules and principles are, I would argue,
present to some degree, not just in the philosophy classroom in which
the structured, open-ended, participant-driven dialogue of CPI is practiced; they are latent in our most meaningul classroom experiences,
even those superficially governed by a monological model, where a
sense of spontaneity and self-organization is allowed free play. And
this is particularly true of the philosophy classroom, given that its
founding, organizing curriculum (Latin, “running course”) is in fact a
set of questions as opposed to a set of facts or claims.
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The Rules of the Game
The rules of CPI are variously explicit and tacit, present on several
levels and in several domains. An apparent freedom from external rules
hides a level in which rules are continually being negotiated. They are
specifically play rules to the extent that they match Erikson’s description of the experience of children’s play as
free movement within prescribed limits . . . a sense of choice and ease and
yet also of driving necessity; of a highly personalized and yet also a traditional pattern; of improvisation in all forma1ization, of surprise in the very
reassurance of formality; . . . of some leeway for innovation in what must be
repeated over and over again. (1963: 212)

The first and perhaps overarching rule is the framework of any scenario that we identify as play. Just as in the example, cited by both
Bruner and Vygotsky, in which two sisters decide to “play sisters,” thus
stepping outside of and re-representing an actual situation in order to
explore a normative theory (theory of sisterhood) through playing that
situation, the normative “rules” of sisterhood (e.g., everything must be
shared with absolute equality, we always take care of each other, and
son on) are clarified; so in CPI the concept “fair,” or “thinking,” or
“responsibility,” or “person” or “animal” is removed from its embeddedness in the interactive world of the every day and thought again.
This is at least suggestive of the first implicit rule of Gregory
Bateson’s (1972) definition of play, which is the paradoxical message, accepted by all participants, “This is play.” As he unpacks this
statement it means, “These actions, in which we now engage, do not
denote what would be denoted by those actions [were they not play]
which these actions denote.” And he offers an example: “The playful
nip denotes the bite, but it does not denote what would be denoted
by the bite” (180). He also ties this to Korbyzki’s notion of the mapterritory relation, whereby “the fact that a message, of whatever kind,
does not consist of those objects which it denotes (‘The word “cat”
cannot scratch us’). Rather, language bears to the objects which it
denotes a relationship comparable to that which a map bears to a territory” (180). In CPI we are engaged in playfully mapping the territory
of the rough, mostly unconscious and often problematic terrain of the
interaction between the common, central and contestable concepts—
friendship, justice, happiness, beauty, success, person, animal, god,
death—by which we guide and understand our lives, and our lived
experience, which both shapes and is shaped by those concepts. We
are so engaged playfully—with what Erikson calls a “non-literal attitude” (“the map is not the territory”) and which Vygotsky identifies
as a form of abstraction (the sisters are developing an abstract concept
of sisterhood). Our concepts (maps) of friendship, justice, happiness,
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beauty, success, person, animal, etc., are not the experience (territory)
of friendship, justice, happiness, beauty, success, person, animal, etc.
They are “as if” concepts, a “projection,” as Bruner (1981) puts it,
“of interior life onto the world, . . . through which we interiorize the
external world and make it part of ourselves” (77). And as the play
therapists Erikson and Meares (1993) argue, this interplay between
map and territory operates on the principal of compensation, in the
interest of competence, equilibration, mastery of traumatic experience,
and mastery of the map-territory relation in general.
On the discursive level, CPI is governed by the rules of both informal and formal logic, which in a typical session it is the job of the
facilitator to identify, model and invoke. They need not, however be
taught, for they are coded, however crudely, into the semantical rules
of grammar. When I say “It is a cat,” I am implicitly committing an
act of classification. When I say “cats can’t talk” I am implicitly committing an act of categorical exclusion. When I say “it’s talking, so it
can’t be a cat,” I am performing a syllogism and invoking the law of
the excluded middle. When I say “it must be a human pretending to
be a cat,” I am making a hypothetical inference; and so on. These are
the linguistic/logical rules of argumentation that are typically given
the most attention in the practice of CPI, since we associate them
with critical thinking and scientific analysis. This, indeed, is the most
common justification offered for the virtues of structured philosophical
dialogue. But we also find in CPI—because it is a philosophical play
space, a transitional space-time in which the boundary between outward
and inward, reason and sense, objective and subjective experience, are
blurred and complicated—that the play of ideas takes over, and we are,
as Hans (invoking Gadamer) points out, “being played by the play . . .
being mastered by the activity itself” (1981, 56).
Hans identifies the Socratic position of ignorance—which epitomizes the initial play position of the game of CPI—as a willingness
to be appropriated by the play of discourse, which, if we allow it and
remain attentive to it, “takes on a life of its own, leading the participants
where it will” (Hans 1981: 70). The implicit rules that we must observe
if we follow the argument where it leads are not just formal rules of
argumentation per se. As Dale Cannon and Mark Weinstein (1993) have
pointed out, they include emergent habits of informal reasoning—recognizing patterns and structures of ideas, exemplifying, applying abstract
principles to concrete situations and contexts, playing with analogies,
models and metaphors and counterfactuals—as well as interpersonal
reasoning, which involves the disposition and ability to take various
points of view into account, and a respect for the opinions of others;
and philosophical reasoning, which involves identifying and exploring
assumptions, clarifying basic criteria of judgment, and exploring and
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clarifying basic concepts (599–600). It also implies the recognition,
after Wittgenstein (2009), that concepts are tools rather than entities
(Par. 569), ways of “finding our way about” within a language/thought
world in which the rules of use are circumstance-dependent, open to
revision, and often non-explicit, and in which our concepts are related
by family resemblance (Par. 670) as opposed to strict propositional
rules. Finally, Nelson Goodman’s five “ways of worldmaking”—that
is a) composition and decomposition, b) weighting, c) ordering, d)
deletion and supplementation and e) deformation (1978: 7–17) present
us with a meta-logical way of describing ways in which the Argument
undergoes continual reconstruction. These rules and principles take us
far beyond understanding the patterns of argumentation that occur in
CPI as a modified form of debate. In the latter, the course of argument
is pre-set—at least by the winner; in CPI, the argument—although it
depends on us—has a life of its own.
The inherent non-linear, autopoeitic character of group dialogue
seeks, as water seeks its level, the “complete system.” The system is
continually under deconstruction and reconstruction, no matter how
ephemeral, chaotic, or entropic its current or final state may be. It
is propelled forward into continual transformation by disequilibrium
(disagreement, emergence of contradiction, search for criteria, new
data, identification of an underlying assumption that must then be
explored, etc.) and is always building, dissipating, or in some chaotic
intermediate stage, goaded forward by the play of difference.
These rules of the game are beyond us: all we can say, with Gadamer, is that the argument “reaches presentation through us.” As Hans
puts it, “it is not the play of subject and object, but the play which
produces subject and object as residues” (Hans 1981: 55). This does
not, however, mean that we are without a task. Our task is, following Socrates’s third great adage,4 a maieutic (from Greek maieutikos,
“midwifery”) one: to allow ourselves be played in such a way that
we assist at the birth of the argument, which involves very concrete
rules—rules of asceticism, at least in relation to the ego and the other.
These are the behavioral, interpersonal, interactive rules of dialogue,
and perhaps the most valuable and transferable from a pedagogical point
of view: listening, restating, reformulating, summarizing, clarifying,
translating between various expressive, cognitive, and discursive styles
and registers, sharing control, and so on. All can be grouped under the
technique of “active listening” (Rogers and Farson 2015), and as such
they emphasize the extent to which the practice of CPI is intrinsically
a therapeutic one, in keeping with the ancient notion of philosophy as
“care of the self,” taking the term “care” in its most inclusive sense. As
such, CPI is a form of conceptual play therapy. To reclaim this ancient
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notion of philosophizing for the classroom is not to reformulate the
inherent goal of philosophy pedagogy, but to return to it.

The Stakes in Play
Philosophical play is “serious” to the extent that it “begins with the
putting-in-question” of our own deeply-held beliefs and assumptions
(Hans 1981: 8). Every form of play embodies its own risks in that it
is dedicated to testing the limits of its own domain, whether it be of
body, mind, or emotions. The fact that play transpires in the realm of
the map rather than the territory does not sever their connection, but
in fact challenges it, vivifies it, and probes the boundary between the
two; the playful nip and the bite are never far from each other. Hans
argues that “Play at all levels is characterized by rupture” (43), a rupture that is perhaps exactly analogous to the cognitive disequilibrium
that results when, in Jean Piaget’s (for which see Bjorklund 1995)
account of human learning, our cognitive schemata are confronted
with information (elements of the territory) that doesn’t fit their classificatory structure (map), which puts into play an exploratory search
dedicated to the reorganization of our schemata such that they can
assimilate the new information. Experience in the world is an ongoing
process of equilibration—of going out of and coming into balance in
the relation between map and territory. In the “as if” world of communal philosophical inquiry, this process is, to be sure “buffered from
its consequences” by the fact that we are, for example, talking about
rather than directly experiencing justice or friendship. However, inquiry
dedicated to the map has its own vertiginous quality. There “justice”
and “friendship” are grappled with within the limitations imposed by
language and logic. We experience the inability to say exactly what we
mean, and the contradictions that we discover in our thinking force us
into self-reflection, which we are often inclined to resist. We discover
that indeed the map is not the territory, but that their relation is ineluctably complicated, and we are returned to the map-territory relation
of the everyday world with a metacognitive space in our heads where
there once was a wall, or nothing.
The risk is also (and perhaps more so) social, given the intrinsically interactive, intersubjective and communicative nature of group
philosophical dialogue. Hans associates the risk in undertaking Socratic
dialogue with the “willingness to be appropriated by the play of discourse” and identifies the interruption with the obligation
to put [one’s] cherished beliefs on the line, to test his beliefs in the play itself,
which can only be done if one is assured that the other participants are doing
the same thing. Calling one’s beliefs into question, after all, is a fundamental
way of subjecting oneself to great risk, for if those beliefs fall, so does one’s
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self-conception. Everyone must be willing to assume the same risk or the
play cannot proceed. (Hans 1981: 70–71)

Hans goes on to suggest that it is in giving oneself to the play of the
discourse—allowing it to unfold through oneself, being committed to
not blocking it—that the real, or deeper challenge lies, for in refusing
the inquiry, “the continual redefinition of man [sic] through the play
of discourse” which is at the heart of the game of Socratic inquiry is
blocked. Outside the “sacred precinct” of the Socratic circle, the conceptual work we have done with the map affects our experience of the
territory—the world of action and interaction, truth and consequence.
As Hans puts it, “[W]hereas its [play’s] rules are mastered in a secure
setting, they are meant to apply to situations in which the setting is
not secure, when one is at stake” (Hans 1981: 72). And if we accept
his broad claim that play is an ontological category, a fundamental
modality of the world, whether material, social or psychological; and
we also understand the world, after Dewey’s pragmatic logic, as a
field of inquiry within which we experience the ongoing deconstruction and reconstruction of the beliefs and theories that we live by and
through5—then the inquiry circle takes on a particularly compelling
quality, promising as it does the growth of concrete reasonableness
through linguistic and logical exploratory play. And again I would
emphasize that this sense of adventure and heightened meaning—of
kairos—is inherent in the practice of philosophizing in general, even
when it is organized as a monological pedagogy, for the common,
central and contestable concepts that make up the warp and weft of
the discipline, when encountered in good faith, immediately resolve
themselves into questions, and as such trigger the play of inquiry. What
is distinctive about CPI as a philosophy pedagogy is that it organizes
the classroom to allow for and encourage this play.

Play and Power
The radical intersubjectivity of the field of meaning of CPI makes of
it a space inextricably associated with the play of power, and therefore
with politics on a most fundamental level. An archeology of power
reveals it as, in Hans’s words, “flows of energy and of the markings
that provide the direction for the flows” (Hans 1981: 74). The flows of
energy are expressions of the play of differences. In the inquiry circle,
as in any social circle, the stage is set for a struggle for dominance,
and on one level, a playing out of the natural human drive toward
inequality. Indeed, most competitive forms of play are intentionally
constructed as ritual struggles for dominance—as agon, whether between individuals or groups. But in CPI, which has ancient roots in the
boule or representative citizens council (in which Socrates served) as
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well as in the group dialogues he convened in multiple venues all over
late 5th century Athens, we recognize an original form of democratic
discourse—of a struggle for equality.
Another genealogical element is found in C. S. Peirce’s (1958)
notion of a “community of inquirers,” which is associated as much
with scientific as with philosophical inquiry, and which is operationalized by Jurgen Habermas (McCarthy 1978) in the notion of an “ideal
speech situation”—a situation, that is, of complete equality in the right
and freedom to speak. This, in turn, is influenced by dialogue theory
(Buber 1948, Silverman 1986, Bohm 1996, Rogers and Farson 2015,
Holquist 1990, Hermans and Hermans-Konopka 2010), which assumes
a form of self-imposed discipline in speech, and an emphasis on careful
listening, restatement and commitment to respectful address. As such,
CPI may be understood as a primary building block of participatory
democracy, a form of discourse that inherently rejects any authority
based on social status, and in which the only authority that is recognized is the authority of the argument itself. In fact, Hans argues that
this quality is intrinsic to the nature of play:
Play itself is not formulated according to a master/slave dialectic . . . nor
does domination have anything to do with it. On the contrary, play requires
foregoing any attitude that centers on domination. It may be a demonstration of skill or excellence, but their goal is never specifically to dominate the
players involved. (Hans 1981: 52)

The upshot of this is that CPI, precisely as a form of play, is an
inherently democratic form. So understood, it links/reaches back to
the rise of political democracy in fifth-century Athens, and forward
to the promise of direct, “deep” democracy announced in the emergence of anarcho-socialist theory and practice in the nineteenth- and
twentieth-century West. For participants in a successfully functioning
CPI, perhaps the most significant and vivid lesson is in the experience
of the “disappearance” of the facilitator as the group assumes his or
her role. Group members of increasingly assume facilitation moves
and responsibilities—speaking up if someone is dominating the conversation, asking for summarization, calling for the judgment of the
group on whether to pursue a particular line of argument, attempting
to locate the argument, and so on. This in itself is a profound lesson
in the non-coercive and non-dominating uses of power—of power
dedicated to the thriving of the whole rather than winning personal
status or self-gratification. As such CPI is a “school for democracy” in
the most direct sense of that term, and emblematic of the connection
between philosophical dialogue and healthy democracy that is the gift
of Socrates and of Periclean Athens to Western history. Issues of power
abound in the classroom, whether in the kindergarten or the university,
and the philosophical issues associated with power are among the most
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important and immediate in the realm of teacher-student relations—especially given its institutionalization in hierarchical, quantified evaluation procedures. The shift from a monological to a dialogical and
polyphonic discourse, especially in philosophy classes, announces a
repositioning of the teacher as primus inter pares, and the curriculum
as a field of playful inquiry as opposed to a reproductive apparatus for
any given historical canon or school of philosophy.

Conclusion
Can CPI not be play? Of course. The very experience of the expression and mediation of difference that is at the core of CPI as a form
of play also represents the possibility of chaos or stagnation and even
repudiation. The attempt to suppress the indeterminacy that this difference represents amounts to a suppression of the game itself. The
element of risk that is at the heart of play cannot be foreclosed without
foreclosing it altogether. And when we consider CPI as a game played
with and among children, whose level of curiosity and explorative
impulses tends—no doubt for evolutionary reasons—to be higher than
adults, the situation becomes more complicated. As Dewey pointed out,
the questions that will make for optimum educational experience are
the questions put by the students themselves. No matter how universal
we consider certain questions, or questions that we feel ought to be
important to students—“What is friendship?” or “What is justice,” for
example—if a question doesn’t represent some kind of problem for
the person asking it, then it is not as liable to trigger the play of CPI.
Children in conventional schools have typically been conditioned
by adult common sense discourses from an early age to understand
every question as having an answer. They are taught by the hidden curriculum or “habitus” of the everyday to ignore the questions that don’t
have an answer as a waste of time. I once facilitated a session with
third graders on the phenomenon of thinking (“What is thinking?”),
and after thirty minutes of interesting dialogue following the concept
through multiple permutations, one of the students asked me, “Now
tell us teacher, what is the answer?” My answer (“I don’t know”) was
received with nods, as if they already understood, and that the question was rhetorical, or even comic, and marked a moment of epistemic
realization. But that was just one moment in a process that represents
the great risk and opportunity of CPI—perhaps the one that led Plato
to condemn doing philosophy with the young as inherently corruptive,
because the next stage tends to be one in which we decide that there
is in fact no answer, and that therefore any one answer is as valuable
as the next. To move beyond the epistemological relativism that easily
moors students in indifference and even a sort of intellectual nihilism
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is only possible when we are in the play state—i.e., when we are “the
subjects of play”—when the answer is “reaching presentation through
us.” When we realize this, we no longer believe that there is no answer, but rather that the answer will, as Peirce apparently believed, be
discovered by the community of inquirers “in the long run.” As such,
the “answer” is represented by the infinitely receding horizon of our
collaborative inquiry, which acts as a lure and a vague promise.
Can the play of CPI be planned? I would argue no—the stage can
only be set for the play. It depends upon the characters involved, and
the particular qualities of the whole—the “chemistry” (which may in
fact be an exact analogy in this case) of the group—as to whether and
how each member gives him or herself (or does not) to the play. Since
shared agency, democratic process, and dialogical communication are
fundamental principles of the game, any success will reflect the fact
that no “one”—facilitator or student(s)—is in charge of posing the
question, the proliferation of positions, and the logical and metalogical
moves that act to deconstruct and reconstruct, in a recursive process of
novelty and repetition, the argument. The autopoiesis of the argument
proceeds through the play of difference in the context of the same, or
as Hans puts it, “a familiar structure that allows one to play with the
unfamiliar” (Hans 1981: 28). And in that CPI is implicitly understood
as an ongoing, diachronic process, that autopoietic movement will shift,
transform, switch, detour, return from session to session.
Given the close connection between play and childhood, it is no
accident that the historical reconstruction of the Socratic inquiry circle
in the recent development of theory and practice of CPI is directly associated with the formulation and development of the Philosophy for
Children program in the 1970s. As Walter Kohan (2017) has argued,
Socrates took “a childlike position in relation to knowledge. . . . [F]or
Socrates the truest relationship to knowledge—knowing nothing and
not believing he knows—is childlike, playful,” and in conflict with
Plato’s view that philosophical play was “not serious enough for the
political challenges of the polis, that it was “too close to childhood,
too open to play, to not knowing, to questioning, to not teaching” (35).
I would take it one step further, and suggest that there is a historical relationship between the legitimation of philosophical play in CPI
and the cultural reconstruction of “child”—in the modern West anyway—as agentic (as opposed to “innocent,” “evil,” “animalic,” “adultin-training,” “little adult”): 6 that is, as co-constructor, as dialogical
interlocutor, as epistemologically interesting, in that he/she embodies
a “way of knowing”; and above all as playful in the Heraclitian sense
of “pais paidon.” Heraclitus’s is among the first (along with Lao
Tzu) to understand childhood as emblematic of—to return to Sartre’s
terms—being-in-itself-for-itself, and as such a prophetic condition.
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This prophetic understanding of “child” is exemplified in post-modern
philosophy, most vividly in Gilles Deleuze’s and Felix Guattari’s (1983)
notion of “becoming child” whereby childhood is understood “not only
as a period of life but as a specific strength, force or intensity that
inhabits a qualitative life at any given chronologic time” (Kohan 2012:
172). In this formulation, childhood is freed from any specific moment
of the life-cycle and understood as a zone, a region of the psyche, a
way of being in time (aionically) a form of intentionality or attention,
a field of intensities and flows, affective and noetic. Becoming-child
means a process of continually becoming other, de- and reterritorializing along “lines of flight” of becoming, of escaping the grasp of the
illusion of sovereign subjectivity. For Deleuze and Guattari, a “block
of childhood” represents an affective and noetic space without predetermined categories of identity and experience, which is in continual
transformation, and involves unlocking affect in new combinations and
flows (1983: chap. 10).7 So understood, “child” is emblematic of an
emergent “post-human” style of subjectivity, more attuned to the play
of the world itself, and an exemplification of Nietzsche’s (1999) “child”
of his “three metamorphoses” or stages/states of human development,
whereby “the spirit shall become a camel, and the camel a lion, and
the lion at last a child,” the latter understood as a creator of new values, and as such a central actor in human evolutionary possibilities.8
To identify Nietzsche’s and Deleuze and Guattari’s “child” with the
actual children with whom we enter the play space in the practice of
philosophy with children is perhaps presumptuous and even a form
of folly, in that the “process of desire” that is becoming-other for
Delueze and Guattari is not ultimately age-related, and both children
and adults experience other becomings-other.9 Rather, whatever their
age or experience, becoming-child is a hidden imperative for anyone
entering the “closed world . . . marked out for the movement of the
game” of communal philosophical dialogue.
In this paper, I have identified five characteristics of play when
understood as an ontological phenomenon, and applied those characteristics to the dynamics of the event of community of philosophical
inquiry, in which philosophical concepts are explored in a communal
dialogical setting. So understood, CPI appears as an autopoietic and
autotelic discourse phenomenon, in which the structure of the “argument”—that is, the organization and evaluation of the philosophical
concepts under discussion—grows through a combination of spontaneous, dialogically triggered both substantive and procedural “moves,”
such as calling for a definition, offering an example or counterexample, making an analogy, summarizing and restating, and so on. On
this account, participants’ understanding of philosophical issues and
arguments is deepened and enhanced through personal encounter with
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those issues in the context of the encounter between multiple points
of view, and through the internalization of argumentation moves as
they both emerge spontaneously in the dialogue and are modelled by
the facilitator and other members of the group. Finally, I suggest that
the dialogical group play of CPI is an inherently childlike discourse,
with connections both to Socrates’s childlike position in relation to
knowledge, and to the post-modern project of “becoming child.”

Notes
1. In this paper I will use the term “community of philosophical inquiry” to identify
a form of group philosophical dialogue whose genealogy can be traced from Socrates,
through C. S. Peirce and Justus Buchler, and first formulated as a contemporary educational practice by Ann Margaret Sharp and Matthew Lipman, founders of the Philosophy
for Children program in the 1970s. For a small sample of original papers devoted to this
discursive practice, see Lipman 1993.
2. The scholars and practitioners whose thinking I highlight in this paper represent
major play theorists in the phenomenological, hermeneutic, and psychoanalytic traditions,
all of whose work falls roughly within the first half of the last century. There are multiple
other emergent sub-fields of play studies, most notably game theory, anthropology of play
and philosophy of sport, which are not reflected here. Most recently, a three-volume series
(Russell, Ryall, and McLean 2018) includes a range of papers that represent multiple
perspectives on the relation between play and philosophy, reflecting Deleuzian, posthuman, and new materialist philosophies, an account of which is not possible in the space
of this paper. The underlying theory of play that informs all of the perspectives reviewed
here may, following Sutton-Smith’s (1997) broad taxonomy of the various “rhetorics”
of play, be characterized as one aspect of what he calls the “The Rhetorics of Fate,” the
assumption that “the universe [is] at play”—that play is a “transcendental state of being,
or ‘flow,’” and a virtual dimension of the very structure of existence.
3. αἰὼν παῖς ἐστι παίζων, πεσσεύων· παιδὸς ἡ βασιληίη: “Aion is a child playing
(‘childing’) a board game. The kingdom is the child’s” (Fragment 52).
4. The first two are “the position of ignorance” and “following the argument where
it leads.”
5. “Inquiry is the controlled or directed transformation of an indeterminate situation
into one that is so determinate in its constituent distinctions and relations as to convert
the elements of the original situation into a unified whole.” Dewey 1938: 104–05.
6. For a genealogy of constructs of “child,” see Sorin and Galloway 2006.
7. For a fuller treatment of this theme, see Kennedy 2013.
8. “Innocence is the child and forgetfulness, a new beginning, a game, a self-rolling
wheel, a first movement, a holy Yes” (Nietzsche 1999: 14).
9. “A kind of order or apparent progression can be established for the segments of
becoming in which we find ourselves: becoming-woman, becoming-child; becominganimal, -vegetable, or -mineral; becomings-molecular of all kinds, becomings-particles.
Fibers lead us from one to the other, transform from one into the other, as they pass through
doors and across thresholds” (Deleuze and Guattari 1980: 272).
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